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Abstract—As the cloud computing technology develops during the last decade, outsourcing data to cloud 
service for storage becomes an attractive trend, which benefits in sparing efforts on heavy data 
maintenance and management. Nevertheless, since the outsourced cloud storage is not fully trustworthy, 
it raises security concerns on how to realize data deduplication in cloud while achieving integrity 
auditing. 
In this work, we study the problem of integrity auditing and secure deduplication on cloud data. 
Specifically, aiming at achieving both data integrity and deduplication in cloud, we propose two secure 
systems, namely SecCloud and SecCloud+. SecCloud introduces an auditing entity with a maintenance of 
a MapReduce cloud, which helps clients generate data tags before uploading as well as audit the integrity 
of data having been stored in cloud. Compared with previous work, the computation by user in SecCloud 
is greatly reduced during the file uploading and auditing phases. SecCloud+ is designed motivated by the 
fact that customers always want to encrypt their data before uploading, and enables integrity auditing 
and secure deduplication on encrypted data. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud storage is a model of networked enterprise 
storage where data is stored in virtualized pools of 
storage which are generally hosted by third parties. 
Cloud storage provides customers with benefits, 
ranging from cost saving and simplified 
convenience, to mobility opportunities and scalable 
service. These great features attract more and more 
customers to utilize and storage their personal data 
to the cloud storage: according to the analysis 
report, the volume of data in cloud is expected to 
achieve 40 trillion gigabytes in 2020. 
Even though cloud storage system has been widely 
adopted, it fails to accommodate some important 
emerging needs such as the abilities of auditing 
integrity of cloud files by cloud clients and 
detecting duplicated files by cloud servers. We 
illustrate both problems below. 
The first problem is integrity auditing. The cloud 
server is able to relieve clients from the heavy 
burden of storage management and maintenance. 
The most difference of cloud storage from 
traditional in-house storage is that the data is 
transferred via Internet and stored in an uncertain 
domain, not under control of the clients at all, 
which inevitably raises clients great concerns on 
the integrity of their data. These concerns originate 
from the fact that the cloud storage is susceptible to 
security threats from both outside and inside of the 
cloud [1], and the uncontrolled cloud servers may 
passively hide some data loss incidents from the 
clients to maintain their reputation. What is more 
serious is that for saving money and space, the 
cloud servers might even actively and deliberately 
discard rarely accessed data files belonging to an 
ordinary client. Considering the large size of the 
outsourced data files and the clients’ constrained 
resource capabilities, the first problem is 
generalized as how can the client efficiently 
perform periodical integrity verifications even 
without the local copy of data files. The second 
problem is secure deduplication. The rapid 
adoption of cloud services is accompanied by 
increasing volumes of data stored at remote cloud 
servers. Among these remote stored files, most of 
them are duplicated: according to a recent survey 
by EMC [2], 75% of recent digital data is 
duplicated copies. This fact raises a technology 
namely deduplication, in which the cloud servers 
would like to deduplicate by keeping only a single 
copy for each file (or block) and make a link to the 
file (or block) for every client who owns or asks to 
store the same file (or block). Unfortunately, this 
action of deduplication would lead to a number of 
threats potentially affecting the storage system 
[3][2], for example, a server telling a client that it 
(i.e., the client) does not need to send the file 
reveals that some other client has the exact same 
file, which could be sensitive sometimes. These 
attacks originate from the reason that the proof that 
the client owns a given file (or block of data) is 
solely based on a static, short value (in most cases 
the hash of the file) [3]. Thus, the second problem 
is generalized as how can the cloud servers 
efficiently confirm that the client (with a certain 
degree assurance) owns the uploaded file (or 
block) before creating a link to this file (or block) 
for him/her. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Since our work is related to both integrity auditing 
and secure deduplication, we review the works in 
both areas in the following subsections, 
respectively.  
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A. Integrity Auditing 
The definition of provable data possession (PDP) 
was introduced by Ateniese et al. [5][6] for 
assuring that the cloud servers possess the target 
files without retrieving or downloading the whole 
data. Essentially, PDP is a probabilistic proof 
protocol by sampling a random set of blocks and 
asking the servers to prove that they exactly 
possess these blocks, and the verifier only 
maintaining a small amount of metadata is able to 
perform the integrity checking. After Ateniese et 
al.’s proposal [5], several works concerned on how 
to realize PDP on dynamic scenario: Ateniese et al. 
[7] proposed a dynamic PDP schema but without 
insertion operation; Erway et al. [8] improved 
Ateniese et al.’s work [7] and supported insertion 
by introducing authenticated flip table; A similar 
work has also been contributed in [9]. 
Nevertheless, these proposals [5][7][8][9] suffer 
from the computational overhead for tag generation 
at the client. To fix this issue, Wang et al. [10] 
proposed proxy PDP in public clouds. Zhu et al. 
[11] proposed the cooperative PDP in multi-cloud 
storage. 
B. Secure Deduplication 
Deduplication is a technique where the server 
stores only a single copy of each file, regardless of 
how many clients asked to store that file, such that 
the disk space of cloud servers as well as network 
bandwidth are saved. However, trivial client side 
deduplication leads to the leakage of side channel 
information. For example, a server telling a client 
that it need not send the file reveals that some other 
client has the exact same file, which could be 
sensitive information in some case. 
In order to restrict the leakage of side channel 
information, Halevi et al. [3] introduced the proof 
of ownership protocol which lets a client efficiently 
prove to a server that that the client exactly holds 
this file. Several proof of ownership protocols 
based on the Merkle hash tree are proposed [3] to 
enable secure client-side deduplication. Pietro and 
Sorniotti [19] proposed an efficient proof of 
ownership scheme by choosing the projection of a 
file onto some randomly selected bit-positions as 
the file proof. 
III. PRELIMINARY 
We now discuss some preliminary notions that will 
form the foundations of our approach. 
A. Bilinear Map and Computational Assumption 
B.  Convergent Encryption 
IV. SECCLOUD 
In this section, we describe our proposed SecCloud 
system. Specifically, we begin with giving the 
system model of Sec- Cloud as well as introducing 
the design goals for SecCloud. 
In what follows, we illustrate the proposed 
SecCloud in detail. 
A. System Model 
Aiming at allowing for auditable and deduplicated 
storage, we propose the SecCloud system. In the 
SecCloud system, we have three entities: 
• Cloud Clients have large data files to be stored 
and rely on the cloud for data maintenance and 
computation. They can be either individual 
consumers or commercial organizations; 
• Cloud Servers virtualize the resources according 
to the requirements of clients and expose them as 
storage pools. Typically, the cloud clients may buy 
or lease storage capacity from cloud servers, and 
store their individual data in these bought or rented 
spaces for future utilization; 
• Auditor which helps clients upload and audit their 
outsourced data maintains a MapReduce cloud and 
acts like a certificate authority. This assumption 
presumes that the auditor is associated with a pair 
of public and private keys. Its public key is made 
available to the other entities in the system. 
The SecCloud system supporting file-level 
deduplication includes the following three 
protocols respectively highlighted by red, blue and 
green in Fig. 1.  
 
1) File Uploading Protocol: This protocol aims at 
allowing clients to upload files via the auditor. 
Specifically, the file uploading protocol includes 
three phases: 
• Phase 1 (cloud client → cloud server): client 
performs the duplicate check with the cloud server 
to confirm if such a file is stored in cloud storage or 
not before uploading a file. If there is a duplicate, 
another protocol called Proof of Ownership will be 
run between the client and the cloud storage server. 
Otherwise, the following protocols (including 
phase 2 and phase 3) are run between these two 
entities. 
• Phase 2 (cloud client → auditor): client uploads 
files to the auditor, and receives a receipt from 
auditor. 
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• Phase 3 (auditor → cloud server): auditor helps 
generate a set of tags for the uploading file, and 
send them along with this file to cloud server. 
2) Integrity Auditing Protocol: It is an interactive 
protocol for integrity verification and allowed to be 
initialized by any entity except the cloud server. In 
this protocol, the cloud server plays the role of 
prover, while the auditor or client works as the 
verifier. This protocol includes two phases: 
• Phase 1 (cloud client/auditor → cloud server): 
verifier (i.e., client or auditor) generates a set of 
challenges and sends them to the prover (i.e., cloud 
server). 
• Phase 2 (cloud server → cloud client/auditor): 
based on the stored files and file tags, prover (i.e., 
cloud server) tries to prove that it exactly owns the 
target file by sending the proof back to verifier 
(i.e., cloud client or auditor). At the end of this 
protocol, verifier outputs true if the integrity 
verification is passed. 
3) Proof of Ownership Protocol: It is an 
interactive protocol initialized at the cloud server 
for verifying that the client exactly owns a claimed 
file. This protocol is typically triggered along with 
file uploading protocol to prevent the leakage of 
side channel information. On the contrast to 
integrity auditing protocol, in PoW the cloud server 
works as verifier, while the client plays the role of 
prover. This protocol also includes two phases 
• Phase 1 (cloud server → client): cloud server 
generates a set of challenges and sends them to the 
client.  
• Phase 2 (client → cloud server): the client 
responds with the proof for file ownership, and 
cloud server finally verifies the validity of proof. 
Our main objectives are outlined as follows. 
• Integrity Auditing. The first design goal of this 
work is to provide the capability of verifying 
correctness of the remotely stored data. The 
integrity verification further requires two features: 
1) public verification, which allows anyone, not 
just the clients originally stored the file, to perform 
verification; 2) stateless verification, which is able 
to eliminate the need for state information 
maintenance at the verifier side between the actions 
of auditing and data storage. 
• Secure Deduplication. The second design goal of 
this work is secure deduplication. In other words, it 
requires that the cloud server is able to reduce the 
storage space by keeping only one copy of the 
same file. Notice that, regarding to secure 
deduplication, our objective is distinguished from 
previous work [3] in that we propose a method for 
allowing both deduplication over files and tags. 
• Cost-Effective. The computational overhead for 
providing ntegrity auditing and secure 
deduplication should not represent a major 
additional cost to traditional cloud storage, nor 
should they alter the way either uploading or 
downloading operation.  
B. SecCloud Details 
In this subsection, we respectively describe the 
three protocols including file uploading protocol, 
integrity auditing protocol and proof of ownership 
protocol in SecCloud. Before our detailed 
elaboration, we firstly introduce the system setup 
phase of SecCloud, which initializes the public and 
private parameters of the system. As declared in 
Section IV-A, the file uploading protocol involves 
three phases. In the first phase shown in Fig. 2, the 
client runs the deduplication test by sending hash 
value of the file Hash(F) to the cloud server. If 
there is a duplicate, the cloud client performs Proof 
of  Ownership protocol with the cloud server which 
will be described later. If it is passed, the user is 
authorized to access this stored file without 
uploading the file.  
 
2) Integrity Auditing Protocol: In the integrity 
auditing protocol, either the MapReduce auditing 
cloud or the client works as the verifier. Thus, 
without loss of generality, in the rest of the 
description of this protocol, we use verifier to 
identify the client or MapReduce auditing cloud. 
The auditing protocol is designed in a challenge-
response model. Specifically, the verifier randomly 
picks a set of block identifiers (say IF) of F and 
asks the cloud server (working as prover) to 
response the blocks corresponding to the identifiers 
in IF. In order to keep randomness in each time of 
challenge, even for the same IF, we introduce a 
random coefficient for each block in challenge. 
Upon receiving the challenge C, as shown in Fig. 3, 
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suppose the Merkle hash tree has been constructed 
as in Fig. 4, and the challenge blocks IF = {2; 5} 
(i.e., challenge B2;B5). The hashes of B2 and B5 
(highlighted by black in Fig. 4), Ω2 (highlighted by 
blue in Fig. 4) and Ω5 (highlighted by orange in 
Fig. 4) are as the proof for retrievability on block-
level. It is worth noting that, although the node 
labeled by x in Fig. 4 is a sibling of node in 
Path(B2), it should not be included in Ω2. This is 
because the node x also belongs to Path(B5) and 
can be re-constructed using Hash(B5) and Ω5. The 
benefit of excluding the nodes in other challenge 
blocks paths is that, it allows us to reconstruct only 
a single version of root node of the Merkle hash 
tree for auditing all the challenge blocks. 
 
 3) Proof of Ownership Protocol: The PoW 
protocol aims at allowing secure deduplication at 
cloud server. Specifically, in deduplication, a client 
claims that he/she has a file F and wants to store it 
at the cloud server, where F is an existing file 
having been stored on the server. The cloud server 
asks for the proof of the ownership of F to prevent 
client unauthorized or malicious access to an 
unowned file through making cheating claim. In 
SecCloud, the PoW protocol is similar to [3] and 
the details are described as follows. 
V. SECCLOUD+ 
We specify that our proposed SecCloud system has 
achieved both integrity auditing and file 
deduplication. However, it cannot prevent the 
cloud servers from knowing the content of files 
having been stored. In other words, the 
functionalities of integrity auditing and secure 
deduplication are only imposed on plain files. In 
this section, we propose SecCloud+, which allows 
for integrity auditing and deduplication on 
encrypted files. 
A. System Model 
Compared with SecCloud, our proposed 
SecCloud+ involves an additional trusted entity, 
namely key server, which is responsible for 
assigning clients with secret key (according to the 
file content) for encrypting files. This architecture 
is in line with the recent work [4]. But our work is 
distinguished with the previous work [4] by 
allowing for integrity auditing on encrypted data. 
SecCloud+ follows the same three protocols (i.e., 
the file uploading protocol, the integrity auditing 
protocol and the proof of ownership protocol) as 
with SecCloud. The only difference is the file 
uploading protocol in SecCloud+ involves an 
additional phase for communication between cloud 
client and key server. That is, the client needs to 
communicate with the key server to get the 
convergent key for encrypting the uploading file 
before the phase 2 in SecCloud. Unlike SecCloud, 
another design goals of file confidentiality is 
desired in SecCloud+ as follows.  
• File Confidentiality. The design goal of file 
confidentiality requires to prevent the cloud servers 
from accessing the content of files. Specially, we 
require that the goal of file confidentiality needs to 
be resistant to “dictionary attack”. That is, even the 
adversaries have pre-knowledge of the “dictionary” 
which includes all the possible files, they still 
cannot recover the target file [4].  
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we attempt to analyze the security 
of our proposed both schemes. Before this, we 
firstly formalize the security definitions our 
schemes aim at capturing. 
A. Security Definitions 
Based on the paradigm of SecCloud and 
SecCloud+, we define the security definitions, 
adapting to the integrity auditing and secure 
deduplication goals. Our both definitions capture 
the philosophy of game-based definition. 
Specifically, we define two games respectively for 
integrity auditing and secure deduplication, and 
both of the games are played by two players, 
namely adversary and challenger. The adversary 
(the role of which is worked by semi-honest cloud 
server and cloud client respectively in integrity 
auditing and secure deduplication definition) is 
trying to achieve the goal condition explicitly 
specified in the game. Having this intuition, we 
give our security definitions as follows. 
1) Integrity Auditing: An integrity auditing 
protocol is sound if any cheating cloud server that 
convinces the verifier that it is storing a file F is 
actually storing this file. To capture this spirit, we 
define its game based on Proof of Retrievability 
(PoR). 
2) Secure Deduplication: Similarly, we can also 
define a game between challenger and adversary 
for secure deduplication below. Notice that the 
game for secure deduplication captures the 
intuition of allowing the malicious client to claim it 
has a challenge file F through colluding with all the 
other clients not owning this file. 
The security in terms of secure deduplication is 
achieved, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time 
adversaries A, the probability that A succeeds in the 
above experiment is negligible.   
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B. Security Proof 
Theorem 1: Assume that the CDH problem is a 
hard problem. Then, the proposed public-verifiable 
PoR scheme satisfies the soundness. That is, no 
adversary could generate an integrity proof for any 
file such that the verifier accepts it with 
nonnegligible probability. 
Proof: We prove the soundness of the construction 
by reduction. Firstly, assume there is an adversary 
who can break the soundness with non-negligible 
probability. We show that how to construct a 
simulator to break the computational Diffie-
Hellman problem through interacting with the 
adversary. During this phase, the simulator is 
required to answer all the queries as the real 
application. In more details, the simulator has to 
answer the tag generation and integrity proof 
queries from the adversary. After the simulation, if 
the adversary outputs a valid tag that is not from 
client, the simulator can use this algorithm to solve 
the CDH problem. Notice that the simulation for 
the n slave nodes can be reduced to just one node 
because of the assumption that all the slave nodes 
are honest-but-curious and they will not collude. 
More clearly, the master key   can be split to n 
subkeys by choosing n − 1 random values and 
assigned to slave nodes as the corresponding 
private keys, while the n-th node is assigned the 
key of   minus the sum of these random values. 
Furthermore, all the data has been encrypted before 
they are outsourced. The data is encrypted with the 
traditional symmetric encryption scheme and the 
key is generated by the key server. The convergent 
key is encrypted by another master key and stored 
in the cloud server. The convergent key has been 
computed from both the file and private key of the 
key server, which means that the convergent key is 
not deterministic only in terms of the file. Even if 
the file is predictable, the adversary cannot guess 
the file with brute-force attack if the adversary is 
not allowed to collude with the key server. 
Because we used the PoW technique, based on the 
assumption of secure PoW scheme, any adversary 
without the file cannot convince the cloud storage 
server to get the corresponding access privilege. 
Thus, our deduplication system is secure in terms 
of the security model.  
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In this section, we will provide a thorough 
experimentale valuation of our proposed schemes. 
We build our testbed by using 64-bit t2.Micro 
Linux servers in Amazon EC2 platform as the 
auditing server and storage server. In order to 
achieve _ = 80 bit security, the prime order p of the 
bilinear group G and GT are respectively chosen as 
160 and 512 bits in length. We also set the block 
size as 4 KB and each block includes 25 sectors. 
 
Fig. 5 shows the time cost of slave node in 
MapReduce for generating file tags. It is clear the 
time cost of slave node is growing with the size of 
file. This is because the more blocks in file, the 
more homomorphic signatures are needed to be 
computed by slave node for file uploading. We also 
need to notice that there does not exist much 
computational load difference between common 
slave nodes and the reducer. Compared with the 
common slave nodes, reducer only additionally 
involves in a number of multiplications, which is 
lightweight operation. It is worthwhile noting that, 
the procedure of tag generation (the phase 2 and 3 
in file uploading protocol) could be handled in 
preprocessing, and it is not necessary for client to 
wait until uploading file. 
To capture the spirit of probabilistic auditing, we 
set the probability confidence _ = 70%; 85% and 
99%, and draw the relationships between _ and m 
in Fig. 6. It demonstrates that if we want to achieve 
low (i.e., 70%), medium (i.e., 85%) and high (i.e., 
99%) confidence of detecting any small fraction of 
corruption, we have to respectively ask for 130; 
190 and 460 blocks for challenge. 
 
Now, we come back to evaluate the time cost of 
file auditing in Fig. 7, which shows the time cost of 
auditing for detecting the misbehavior of cloud 
storage respectively with 70%; 85% and 99% 
confidence. Obviously, as the growth of the 
number of blocks for challenge (to guarantee 
higher confidence), the time cost for response from 
cloud storage server is increasing. This is because it 
needs to compute all the exponentiations for each 
challenge block as well as the coefficient for each 
column of S. Correspondingly, the time cost at 
auditor grows with the number of challenge blocks 
as well. But compared with cloud storage, the rate 
is slightly lower, because auditor only needs to 
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aggregate the homomorphic signature of the 
challenged blocks. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Aiming at achieving both data integrity and 
deduplication in cloud, we propose SecCloud and 
SecCloud+. SecCloud introduces an auditing entity 
with maintenance of a MapReduce cloud, which 
helps clients generate data tags before uploading as 
well as audit the integrity of data having been 
stored in cloud. In addition, SecCoud enables 
secure deduplication through introducing a Proof of 
Ownership protocol and preventing the leakage of 
side channel information in data deduplication. 
Compared with previous work, the computation by 
user in SecCloud is greatly reduced during the file 
uploading and auditing phases. SecCloud+ is an 
advanced construction motivated by the fact that 
customers always want to encrypt their data before 
uploading, and allows for integrity auditing and 
secure deduplication directly on encrypted data. 
IX. REFERENCES 
[1]  M. Armbrust, A. Fox, R. Griffith, A. D. 
Joseph, R. Katz, A. Konwinski, G. Lee, D. 
Patterson, A. Rabkin, I. Stoica, and M. 
Zaharia, “A view of cloud computing,” 
Communication of the ACM, vol. 53, no. 4, 
pp. 50–58, 2010. 
[2]  J. Yuan and S. Yu, “Secure and constant 
cost public cloud storage auditing with 
deduplication,” in IEEE Conference on 
Communications and Network Security 
(CNS), 2013, pp. 145–153. 
[3]  S. Halevi, D. Harnik, B. Pinkas, and A. 
Shulman-Peleg, “Proofs of ownership in 
remote storage systems,” in Proceedings of 
the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security. ACM, 2011, pp. 
491–500. 
[4]  S. Keelveedhi, M. Bellare, and T. 
Ristenpart, “Dupless: Serveraided 
encryption for deduplicated storage,” in 
Proceedings of the 22Nd USENIX 
Conference on Security, ser. SEC’13. 
Washington, D.C.: USENIX Association, 
2013, pp. 179–194. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixse
curity13/technicalsessions/presentation/bella
re 
[5]  G. Ateniese, R. Burns, R. Curtmola, J. 
Herring, L. Kissner, Z. Peterson, and D. 
Song, “Provable data possession at 
untrusted stores,” in Proceedings of the 14th 
ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, ser. CCS ’07. 
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2007, pp. 
598– 609. 
[6] G. Ateniese, R. Burns, R. Curtmola, J. 
Herring, O. Khan, L. Kissner, Z. Peterson, 
and D. Song, “Remote data checking using 
provable data possession,” ACM Trans. Inf. 
Syst. Secur., vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 12:1–12:34, 
2011. 
[7]  G. Ateniese, R. Di Pietro, L. V. Mancini, 
and G. Tsudik, “Scalable and efficient 
provable data possession,” in Proceedings 
of the 4
th
 International Conference on 
Security and Privacy in Communication 
Netowrks, ser. SecureComm ’08. New York, 
NY, USA: ACM, 2008, pp. 9:1–9:10. 
[8]  C. Erway, A. K¨upc¸ ¨u, C. Papamanthou, 
and R. Tamassia, “Dynamic provable data 
possession,” in Proceedings of the 16th 
ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, ser. CCS ’09. 
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 
213–222. 
[9]  F. Seb´e, J. Domingo-Ferrer, A. Martinez-
Balleste, Y. Deswarte, and J.-J. Quisquater, 
“Efficient remote data possession checking 
in critical information infrastructures,” IEEE 
Trans. on Knowl. and Data Eng., vol. 20, 
no. 8, pp. 1034–1038, 2008. 
[10]  H. Wang, “Proxy provable data possession 
in public clouds,” IEEE Transactions on 
Services Computing, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 551–
559, 2013.  
AUTHOR’s PROFILE 
Machani Prasanna kumar received B.Tech 
Degree from Sri Sai Jyothi 
Engineering College in Hyderabad. 
He is currently pursuing M.tech 
Degree in Software Engineering 
specialization in Yerrakota, kurnool, 
India.  
Mr.GKV Narasimha Reddy received Ph.D from 
Annamalai University and received 
M.tech degree from Sathyabama 
University. He is currently working 
as Associate professor, Department 
of CSE, in St.Johns College of 
engineering and technology, 
Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh, India. His interests 
include Computer Networks, Operating system, 
Data Base Management Systems. 
